Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 392: Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery
Wisdom Akpalu (), Håkan Eggert () and Godwin K. Vondolia ()
Additional contact information
Wisdom Akpalu: Department of History, Economics and Politics, State University of New York at Farmingdale, Postal: 2350 Broadhollow Rd., NY, 11735, USA
Håkan Eggert: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Godwin K. Vondolia: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.
Keywords: Natural resource management; bribery; law enforcement; social exclusion
19 pages, November 30, 2009
Full text files
21489 HTML file
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Jessica Oscarsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0392This page generated on 2024-11-14 18:33:27.