Amrish Patel (), Edward Cartwright () and Van Vugt Mark ()
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Amrish Patel: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Edward Cartwright: Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Postal: Canterbury,, Kent. CT2 7NP. UK.
Van Vugt Mark: Department of Work and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Postal: 1081 BT Amsterdam,, The Netherlands.
Abstract: Individuals often have legitimate but publicly unobservable reasons for not partaking in cooperative social endeavours. This means others who lack legitimate reasons may then have the opportunity to behave uncooperatively, i.e. free-ride, and be indistinguishable from those with legitimate reasons. Free-riders have a degree of anonymity. In the context of a public good game we consider the e¤ect of free-rider anonymity on the ability of voluntary punishment to sustain cooperative social norms. Despite only inducing a weak form of free-rider anonymity, punishment falls and cannot sustain cooperation.
Keywords: Anonymity; free-riding; public goods experiment; punishment
28 pages, May 19, 2010
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