Peter Martinsson (), Kristian Ove R. Myrseth () and Conny Wollbrant ()
Additional contact information
Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth: ESMT European School of Management and Technology, Berlin, Germany
Conny Wollbrant: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: When facing the opportunity to allocate resources between oneself and others, individuals may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and preferences to act pro-socially. We explore the domain of conditional cooperation, and we test the hypothesis that increased expectations about others’ average contribution increases own contributions to public goods more when self-control is high than when it is low. We pair a subtle framing technique with a public goods experiment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conditionally cooperative behavior is stronger (i.e., less imperfect) when expectations of high contributions are accompanied by high levels of self-control.
Keywords: Self-control; Pro-social behavior; Public good experiment; Conditional cooperation
25 pages, August 5, 2010
Full text files
23048 HTML file
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2024-02-05 17:11:22.