Martin G. Kocher (), Peter Martinsson (), Dominik Matzat () and Conny Wollbrant ()
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Martin G. Kocher: Department of Economics, University of Munich
Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Dominik Matzat: Department of Economics, University of Munich
Conny Wollbrant: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the role of beliefs, trust, and risk in shaping cooperative behavior. By applying incentivized elicitation methods to measure these concepts, we find that beliefs about others’ behavior and trust are positively associated with cooperation in a public goods game. However, even though contributing unconditionally to a public good resembles a situation of making decisions under risk, elicited risk preferences do not seem to explain cooperation in a systematic way.
Keywords: Public goods; cooperation; risk preferences; trust; experiment
30 pages, January 12, 2011
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