Fredrik Carlsson (), Mitesh Kataria (), Elina Lampi () and M., Vittoria Levati ()
Additional contact information
Fredrik Carlsson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Mitesh Kataria: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena
Elina Lampi: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
M., Vittoria Levati: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena
Abstract: We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others’ choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that people are generally disposed to grant freedom of choice, but only within certain limits. In addition, our results are in line with the widely held belief that economists are more selfish than other people. Yet, against the notion of consumer sovereignty, economists are not less likely to restrict others’ choices and impose restrictions closer to their own preferences than the other student groups.
Keywords: dictator game; charitable giving; social preferences; freedom of choice
24 pages, January 27, 2011
Full text files
24287 HTML file
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Jessica Oscarsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0487This page generated on 2024-11-14 18:33:27.