Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 488: Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms
Amrish Patel () and Edward Cartwright ()
Additional contact information
Amrish Patel: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Edward Cartwright: Department of Economics, University of Kent, Postal: Canterbury, Kent,, United Kingdom, CT2 7NP
Abstract: In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.
Keywords: Signalling; Conformity; Social Norms; Naïve Beliefs
13 pages, February 18, 2011
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