Martin G. Kocher (), Peter Martinsson (), Kristian Ove R. Myrseth () and Conny Wollbrant ()
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Martin G. Kocher: Dept of Economics, University of Munich, and CESifo Munich, and Dept of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth: ESMT European School of Technology and Management, Postal: Schlossplatz 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
Conny Wollbrant: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O.Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Abstract: We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires self-control effort. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
Keywords: self-control; cooperation; public good; risk; experiment
55 pages, First version: January 18, 2012. Revised: April 2, 2013.
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