Thomas Aronsson () and Olof Johansson-Stenman ()
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Thomas Aronsson: Umeå School of Business and Economics, Dept of Economics,, Postal: Umeå University, SE 90187 UMEÅ, Sweden
Olof Johansson-Stenman: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Abstract: This paper derives Pareto efficient policy rules for the provision of national as well as global public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about relative consumption within as well as between countries. Furthermore, we compare these policy rules with those that follow from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The results show that both global and national public goods are systematically under-provided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns.
Keywords: Public goods; relative consumption; inter-jurisdictional comparison; status; positional goods.
21 pages, September 17, 2012
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