Kristian Ove R. Myrseth (), Gerhard Riener () and Conny Wollbrant ()
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Kristian Ove R. Myrseth: ESMT European School of Management and Technology, Postal: Schlossplatz 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany
Gerhard Riener: DICE, University of Düsseldorf, Postal: Universitätsstr. 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany
Conny Wollbrant: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O.Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract: The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control—and a stronger negative association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which self-control matters for cooperation.
Keywords: Self-control; Pro-social behavior; Public good experiment; Temptation
37 pages, June 7, 2013
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