Peter Martinsson (), Haileselassie Medhin () and Emil Persson ()
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Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O Box 640, SE 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
Haileselassie Medhin: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O Box 640, SE 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
Emil Persson: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O Box 640, SE 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations.
Keywords: Choice architecture; Framing; Public goods; Minimum level; Experiment; Ethiopia.
25 pages, April 2016
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