Martin Dufwenberg () and Katarina Nordblom ()
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Martin Dufwenberg: University of Arizona, University of Gothenburg, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Katarina Nordblom: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Abstract: How do moral concerns affect tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring an inspection game, modified to incorporate belief-dependent taxpayer guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the authority's more than the citizen's) and regarding policy, in particular fines vs. jail, the role of information campaigns, and the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.
Keywords: tax evasion; guilt; inspection game; policy
33 pages, August 2018
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