Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 796: Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games
Lea Heursen, Eva Ranehill () and Roberto A Weber
Additional contact information
Lea Heursen: Department of Economics, Humboldt University Berlin
Eva Ranehill: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Roberto A Weber: Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Abstract: We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating action by followers. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to coordinate on efficient equilibria. Group performance hinges on higher-order beliefs about the leader’s capacity to convince followers to pursue desired actions, making beliefs that women are less effective leaders potentially self-confirming. We find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance, identifying a precisely-estimated null effect. We show that this absence of an effect is surprising given experts’ priors.
Keywords: gender; coordination games; leadership; experiment
84 pages, November 2020
Full text files
66908 HTML file Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Jessica Oscarsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0796This page generated on 2024-11-14 18:33:28.