Nadine Chlass (), Werner Güth () and Topi Miettinen ()
Additional contact information
Nadine Chlass: Friedrich Schiller University, Germany
Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Germany
Topi Miettinen: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Postal: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Keywords: procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness
23 pages, First version: August 13, 2009. Revised: October 21, 2014. Earlier revisions: October 20, 2014, October 20, 2014.
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