(), Peter Högfeldt
(), Jonathan R Macey
and Per Samuelsson
Clas Bergström: Dept. of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Peter Högfeldt: Dept. of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: A well-functioning market for corporate control is considered by the EC Commission as an important method for monitoring incumbent management and for improving the allocation of resources within Europe. This article examines the regulation of corporate acquisitions in Europe as well as inherent restrictions on takeovers from a law and economics perspective. We find that the European proposals for reform in the proposed 13th Company Law directive do not live up to their promise of encouraging acquisitions. Indeed, we find that the proposed rules inhibit acquisitions in significant ways, and therefore are more likely to result in reduced monitoring of incumbent management and in inefficiencies in the allocation of productive resources in Europe.
33 pages, November 1994
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