Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics
No 110: Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance
Ake Blomqvist and Per-Olov Johansson ()
Additional contact information
Ake Blomqvist: Department of Economics, Postal: University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2
Per-Olov Johansson: Centre for Health Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, S-113 83 STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN
Abstract: In this paper we discuss the efficiency properties of insurance markets where supplementary private insurance is allowed to exist together with a compulsory government insurance plan. Our main conclusion, which is contrary to both those of Besley (1989) and Selden (1993), is that in a simple model focussing on the moral hazard problem alone, a mixed system will generally be strictly less efficient than a purely private (competitive) system. We also show that there is a flaw in Selden's (1993) main proposition, which at least in part invalidates his result on the welfare properties of systems of mixed government/private insurance.
Keywords: Health insurance; moral hazard; optimal insurance; government insurance
16 pages, March 1996
- Published as
- Ake Blomqvist and Per-Olov Johansson, (1997), 'Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance', Journal of Public Economics, vol 66, pages 505-516
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:hastef:0110This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:15:03.