Fredrik Bergström: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Governments all over the world grant different types of subsidies to firms which are said to have a lack-of-capital problem. However, it is unclear if governments have the information and motivation to target firms which have problems to finance profitable project via the private capital markets. Based on hypotheses derived from interest group theory, this paper compares (econometrically) characteristics of Swedish firms targeted for selective regional policy supports with randomly chosen non-supported firms. The results give some support for an interest group interpretation of the allocation of subsidies.
27 pages, November 23, 1998
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