and Björn Segendorff
Amihai Glazer: Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine
Björn Segendorff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: A leader of an organization may view a subordinate as threatening or weakening the leader's position. The threat may increase with the subordinate's ability and reduce the rents the leader wins. In particular, a leader who trains his subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power. The leader therefore provides inefficiently low training for the subordinate.
13 pages, January 21, 2001
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