and María Sáez Martí
Douglas Lundin: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
María Sáez Martí: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 5501, SE-114 85 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Publicly provided health care implies considerable intergenerational redistribution. The possibility of accumulating a fund or debt will affect the degree of redistribution as well as how efficient the financing of health care is. In a voting model we study how governments inability to make binding long-term policy commitments will affect the accumulation of a fund or debt. Today's government will base its policy decisions on expectations about future governments behavior and simply follow suit, which results in strong political inertia. Either a fund or debt may therefore be upheld in political equilibrium. But no mechanism ensure that it is at its optimal level. If there is fund in steady state, the more political clout the old have the smaller will the fund be, i.e saving decrease. If there is debt, however, a politically stronger old generation may imply a smaller debt, i.e. savings increase.
15 pages, January 7, 2002
Full text files
hastef0486.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-27 00:01:29.