Jesper Roine: Dept. of Economic Statistics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.
12 pages, May 27, 2003
Full text files
hastef0529.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-27 00:01:30.