(), Willemien Kets
and Henk Norde
Mark Voorneveld: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Willemien Kets: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Henk Norde: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abstract: Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.
11 pages, First version: March 4, 2005. Revised: March 23, 2005. Earlier revisions: March 18, 2005.
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