() and Erik Wengström
Ola Andersson: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Erik Wengström: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, bygning 26, 1353 København, Denmark
Abstract: This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure-strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of McCutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.
8 pages, March 22, 2010
Full text files
hastef0725.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-27 00:01:38.