and David Granlund
Thomas Aronsson: Umeå University, Postal: Department of Economics, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
David Granlund: The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI), Postal: Regeringsgatan 60, 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden, and Department of Economics, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: This paper deals with the optimal provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model, when the consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The results show that the preference for immediate gratification facing the (mimicking) high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust the public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.
7 pages, June 1, 2010
Note: Public Goods; Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting; Redistribution; Asymmetric Information
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Nilsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-02-05 20:50:23.