Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

No 2002:6: Sick of being unemployed? Interactions between unemployment and sickness insurance in Sweden

Laura Larsson
Additional contact information
Laura Larsson: IFAU - Insitute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Postal: Labour Market Policy Evaluation, P O Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract: This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden’s social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent sick period among the unemployed are affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick-report rate because SI offers greater compensation than UI. But neither of these factors seems to have a significant effect on the length of the sick period.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; sickness insurance; health; duration analysis; discrete hazard models

JEL-codes: C41; H55; I18; J64; J65

34 pages, March 18, 2002

Full text files

wp02-06.pdf PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Ali Ghooloo ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-03-18 13:49:11.