Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

No 2006:15: Screening disability insurance applications

Philip de Jong , Maarten Lindeboom and Bas van der Klaauw ()
Additional contact information
Philip de Jong: University of Amsterdam
Maarten Lindeboom: Free University Amsterdam
Bas van der Klaauw: Free University Amsterdam, Postal: DeBoelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.

Keywords: Disability insurance; experiment; policy evaluation; sickness absenteeism; self-screening

JEL-codes: J26; J65

23 pages, November 30, 2006

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