Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Seminar Papers,
Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies
No 624: Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts
Nils-Petter Lagerlöf
Additional contact information
Nils-Petter Lagerlöf: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, Postal: Stockholm University, S-106 69 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.
Keywords: Dynamic efficiency; Altruism; Gifts; Overlapping generations; Saving
20 pages, October 31, 1997
Full text files
FULLTEXT01
- Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies
- Ordering Working Papers
- Home page for this series
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Hanna Christiansson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0624This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:15:25.