Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics,
Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority)

Abstract: A margin squeeze is an exclusionary abuse which occurs when a vertically integrated telecoms operator creates a disparity between upstream and downstream prices with the intention of squeezing an access competitor’s profits. The purpose of such pricing is either to increase the latter’s entry costs, delay profitability or limit their ability to remain or expand on markets. However, traditional market definitions are being challenged by (1) the technological convergence of services and (2) innovative product offerings taking advantage of this convergence. Consumers now routinely purchase a bundle of telecoms services with a single payment (known as ‘quad play’), including fixed and mobile voice calls, broadband connectivity, and premium broadcasting content. How should such unilateral conduct be assessed ex post by a competition authority under Article 102 TFEU? We suggest that convergence and innovation present both theoretical and practical difficulties for assessing “muddled margins” on telecoms markets. New and different enforcement approaches to exclusion will have to be formulated within the Article 102 framework and tested in the Courts. This may even require abstaining from applying Article 102 TFEU during material periods of convergence, and confining ex post enforcement activity to sector regulation, even when this is inferior for safeguarding effective competition.

Keywords: margin-squeeze; antitrust

JEL-codes: K21

33 pages, June 25, 2015

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