Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics,
Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority)

Abstract: We examine the incentives for a gatekeeper controlling a competitive bottle neck, whether it be a digital platform, supermarket shelf space, or a classical infrastructure such as a telecommunications network, to exploit or exclude competitors by means of self-preferencing. Our focus is on pricing conduct, so called price squeeze, but we also touch on non-price conduct. We characterize the welfare efects of restricting price squeeze through antitrust intervention or regulation. We also examine how such policies afect incentives to undertake cost reducing investments, both for the gatekeeper as well as for its competitors.

Keywords: Price squeeze; bundling; price discrimination; foreclosure; antitrust; pass through.

JEL-codes: D42; D43; K21; L24; L41; L42; L44

Language: English

32 pages, December 1, 2023

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