Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Discussion Papers,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

No 2008/12: Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection

Eivind Stensholt ()
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Eivind Stensholt: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

Abstract: A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.

Keywords: Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem

JEL-codes: D72

3 pages, June 12, 2008

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