Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Discussion Papers,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science
No 2011/21: Insider trading with partially informed traders
Knut K. Aase (), Terje Bjuland () and Bernt Øksendal ()
Additional contact information
Knut K. Aase: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Terje Bjuland: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Bernt Øksendal: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Abstract: The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can be manipulated. Unlike Kyle's assumption that the quantity traded by the noise traders is independent of the asset value, we assume that the noise traders are able to correlate their trade with the true price. This has several implications for the equilibrium, one being that the insider's expected profits decrease as the noise traders' ability to correlate positively improve. In the limit, the noise traders do not lose on average, and the insider makes zero expected profits. When the correlation is negative, we interpret this as manipulation. In this case the insider makes the highest expected profits, and the informativeness of prices is at its minimum.
Keywords: Insider trading; asymmetric information; strategic trade; correlated trade; partially informed noise traders
JEL-codes: G00
16 pages, November 15, 2011
Full text files
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