Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Discussion Papers,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

No 2017/1: Conditions for effective risk sharing against marine pollution: the case of the Ría de Vigo

Schimon Grossmann () and Michael Faure ()
Additional contact information
Schimon Grossmann: Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics, Postal: NHH , Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Michael Faure: METRO, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Postal: Maastricht University, METRO, Faculty of Law, PO Box 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

Abstract: The question of how effective protection against environmental impairment can be provided has spawned much literature. One instrument that is often invoked to provide compensation for environmental damage is insurance. Traditionally, a distinction is made between first and third party insurance. First party insurance may be acquired by potential victims of marine pollution, such as fisheries seriously harmed by ship-source oil spills. Conversely, third party insurance is sought by polluters to cover their legal responsibility and, at the same time, protect the potential victims from polluters unable to meet their financial obligations.

Keywords: Risk sharing; marine pollution

JEL-codes: Q50; Q53

11 pages, January 31, 2017

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