Working Papers,
National Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Simulation experiments are conducted, comparing the effects of a common reduction of CO2 emissions within the European Union to a Swedish unilateral decicion to reduce CO2 emissions. A numerical general equilibrium model, GEM-E3, has been used as analytical tool. The model covers all European Union countries, with production disaggregated into 18 sectors. The 13 consumption goods included are classified into three consumption categories (durable, non-linked non-durable and linked durable goods) in order to imporve the energy allocation description. In addition, industry exemption of CO2 tax is studied. The results indicate that if Sweden unilaterally decides to increase its carbon dioxide tax, the total European Union carbon dioxide emissions will increase, i.e. there will be a "carbon leakage" effect. Perhaps more surprisingly, a European Union multilateral implementation of a carbon dioxide tax rate will induce a lower welfare (exluding environmental benefits) in Sweden as compared to the situation where the same carbon dioxide tax was introduced unilaterally in Sweden.

Keywords: CO2 taxation; Climate policy; Computable General Equilibrium; Unilatera actions; Multilateral actions.

29 pages, November 1, 1999

Full text files

WP_66.pdf  

Download statistics

• National Institute of Economic Research
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sarah Hegardt Grant ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:nierwp:0066This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:24.