Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

HERO Online Working Paper Series,
University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

No 1999:1: Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing

Michael Hoel () and Tor Iversen ()
Additional contact information
Michael Hoel: Department of Economics, Postal: University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Tor Iversen: Institute of Health Management and Health Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway

Abstract: Privacy of information is a central concern in the debate about genetic testing. Two types of social inefficiencies may occur when information about prevention and test status is private; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with public insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is likely for those with a mix of public/private insurance. This second type of inefficiency is shown to be more important the less effective prevention is.

Keywords: Health insurance; genetic testing

JEL-codes: I11

20 pages, July 1, 2009

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