Geir B. Asheim
(), Tore Nilssen
() and Anne Wenche Emblem
Geir B. Asheim: Department of Economics, Postal: University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Tore Nilssen: Department of Economics, Postal: University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Anne Wenche Emblem: School of Management, Postal: Agder University College, Norway
Abstract: We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
17 pages, June 29, 2009
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Anbjørg Kolaas ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:37:03.