Dag Morten Dalen (), Tonje Habeth and Steinar Strøm ()
Additional contact information
Dag Morten Dalen: Handelshøyskolen BI, Postal: N-0442 Oslo, Norway
Tonje Habeth: Handelshøyskolen BI, Postal: N-0442 Oslo, Norway
Steinar Strøm: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Postboks 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick based price regulation schemes on a selection of drugs experiencing generic competition. The retail price cap, termed “index price”, on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the three lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This is supposed to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to trigger price competition. Using monthly data over the period 1998-2004 for the 6 drugs (chemical entities) included in the index price system, we estimate a structural model enabling us to examine the impact of the reform on both demand and market power. Our results suggest that the index price helped to increase the market shares of generic drugs and succeeded in triggering price competition.
Keywords: Discrete choice; demand for pharmaceuticals; monopolistic competition; evaluation of yardstick based price regulation
28 pages, June 4, 2009
Full text files
HERO2006_1.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kristi Brinkmann Lenander ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2006_001This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:49.