Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Nadja Kairies-Schwarz and Daniel Wiesen ()
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Jeannette Brosig-Koch: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
Heike Hennig-Schmidt: Department of Health Management and Health Economics, Postal: HERO / Department of Health Management and Health Economics, P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Nadja Kairies-Schwarz: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
Daniel Wiesen: Department of Health Management and Health Economics, Postal: HERO / Department of Health Management and Health Economics, P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: We analyze how physicians, medical students, and non-medical students respond to nancial incentives from fee-for-service and capitation. We employ a series of artefactual eld and conventional lab experiments framed in a physician decision-making context. Physicians, participating in the eld, and medical and non-medical students, participating in lab experiments, respond to the incentives in a consistent way: Signi - cantly more medical services are provided under fee-for-service compared to capitation. Our ndings are robust regarding subjects' gender, age, and personality traits.
Keywords: artefactual field Experiment; laboratory experiment; fee-for-service; capitation; physician behavior
19 pages, November 26, 2014
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