John K. Dagsvik
John K. Dagsvik: Department of Health Management and Health Economics, Postal: HERO / Department of Health Management and Health Economics, P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: This paper investigates the set of equilibria in models of social interaction and Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). First, we discuss how models of social interaction can be viewed as a special case of QRE. Subsequently, we establish criteria that characterize the set of equilibria in models of social interaction and QRE. Finally, we establish conditions for convergence of sequential stochastic game models to QRE when players learn about the aggregate behavior of the players.
17 pages, October 6, 2020
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