Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)

No 166: Populism

Lars Frisell ()
Additional contact information
Lars Frisell: Research Department, Central Bank of Sweden, Postal: Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an intermediate parameter range, both populism and its opposite, “candor”, can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public’s trust or distrust in politicians may be self-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can be avoided.

Keywords: popular opinion; electoral competition; candidate motivation; pandering; political trust

JEL-codes: D72; D82

27 pages, June 1, 2004

Full text files 

WP_166.pdf PDF-file

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lena Löfgren ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0166This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:57.