Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Paper Series,
Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)
No 277: A detrimental feedback loop: deleveraging and adverse selection
Christoph Bertsch ()
Additional contact information
Christoph Bertsch: Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden, Postal: Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Market distress can be the catalyst of a deleveraging wave, as in the 2007/08 financial crisis. This paper demonstrates how market distress and deleveraging can fuel each other in the presence of adverse selection problems in asset markets. At the core of the detrimental feedback loop is agents' desire to reduce their reliance on distressed asset markets by decreasing their leverage which in turn amplifies the adverse selection problem in asset markets. In the extreme case, this leads to a market breakdown. I find that adverse selection creates both an "ex-ante" inefficiency because it distorts agents' long-term leverage choices and an "interim" inefficiency because it distorts agents' short-term liquidity management. I derive important implications for central bank policy.
Keywords: Leverage; endogenous borrowing constraints; financial crisis; liquidity; asymmetric information; central bank policy
51 pages, September 1, 2013
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rap_wp277_131010.pdf
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