Working Paper Series,
Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)

Abstract: Most empirical research on the effects of transparency on monetary policy committees is based on a natural experiment in 1993 at the Federal Reserve, when it was decided that transcripts of meetings would be released with a five-year lag. Evidence is found of both a conformity effect (reluctance to offer dissenting opinions) and a discipline effect (more thorough preparation). We investigate the effects of increased transparency on a monetary policy committee using another and arguably more timely natural experiment. In May 2007, the Swedish central bank started to include the names of Executive Board members in the minutes of monetary policy meetings. We find that members began to put more effort into explaining their views (a form of discipline effect), that interaction between members decreased, and that references to members’ own previous views became more common. A key insight is that the effects of increased transparency depend on the nature of the change and the type of committee.

Keywords: Central bank communication; central bank transparency; committee decision making; text analysis

JEL-codes: D71; E52; E58

Language: English

44 pages, February 1, 2026

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