Cristian Litan (), Francisco Marhuenda () and Peter Sudhölter ()
Additional contact information
Cristian Litan: Department of Statistics, Forecasting, Mathematics, Postal: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania
Francisco Marhuenda: Department of Economics, Postal: University Carlos III og Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903-Getafe (Madrid), Spain
Peter Sudhölter: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Abstract: We show the generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria for two-person game forms such that either (i) one of the players has no more than two strategies or (ii) both of the players have three strategies, and (iii) for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies. Finally, we exhibit an example of a game form with three outcomes and three players for which the Nash equilibria of the associated game induce a continuum of payoffs for an open non-empty set of utility profiles.
Keywords: Outcome game form; Completely mixed Nash equilibrium; Generic finiteness
JEL-codes: C72
9 pages, November 5, 2014
Full text files
dpbe17_2014.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Astrid Holm Nielsen ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_017This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:17:01.