Niels Nannerup () and Kasper Krogh Olsen ()
Additional contact information
Niels Nannerup: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Kasper Krogh Olsen: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Abstract: In a principal-agent setting, we consider a combined problem of multitasking and performance measurement. The principal can choose to reward the agent both directly for providing effort into a specific activity, and based on the outcome delivered to the principal. Both the issue of multitasking and any private knowledge the agent might possess will lead the principal to use a performance measurement more. This applies even if the measurement is poorly correlated with the actual outcome to the principal.
Keywords: Multitasking; pay for performance
22 pages, December 16, 2014
Full text files
dpbe20_2014.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Astrid Holm Nielsen ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_020This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:17:01.