() and Jan Guldager Jørgensen
Dapeng Cai: Nanzan University, Postal: Japan
Jan Guldager Jørgensen: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Abstract: We model a two-country bargaining process over the coordination of a horizontally differentiated product standard. We show that the necessary conditions for bargaining to take place are (i) firm heterogeneity and (ii) sufficiently high complying costs. When firms compete à la Cournot in the Home market and when bargaining takes place, our results suggest that mutual recognition of standards, and not the harmonization of standards, inevitably emerges as Home’s optimal choice. We also demonstrate that mutual recognition can maximize global welfare. Our results largely hold when firms compete à la Bertrand.
31 pages, January 6, 2017
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lene Holbæk ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:37:43.