Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Discussion Papers on Economics,
University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

No 4/2020: Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games

Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena and Peter Sudhölter ()
Additional contact information
Pedro Calleja: Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Postal: Universitat de Barcelona-BEAT, Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
Francesc Llerena: Departament de Gestió d'Empreses, Postal: Universitat Rovira i Virgili-CREIP, Av. de la Universitat, 1, 43204 Reus, Spain,
Peter Sudhölter: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark

Abstract: We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, strengthening core selection into bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler, and Pareto optimality into individual rationality and bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell, we obtain alternative and stylized axiomatic approaches.

Keywords: Dutta-Rays egalitarian solution; axiomatizations; convex TU game

JEL-codes: C71

14 pages, April 16, 2020

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