Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Paper Series,
Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research
No 3/2011: Incentives from Curriculum Tracking: Cross-national and UK Evidence
Kristian Koerselman ()
Additional contact information
Kristian Koerselman: Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, Postal: SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Curriculum tracking creates incentives before its start, and we should expect scores in tested subjects to be higher at that point. I find evidence from both UK and international data for sizable incentive effects. Incentive effects are important from a methodological perspective because they lead to downward bias in value-added estimates of the later age effect of tracking on achievement. They also invalidate placebo tests that work by regressing pre-tracking scores on tracking policies.
Keywords: incentives; curriculum tracking; ability streaming; high-stakes testing; student achievement
25 pages, February 16, 2011
Full text files
WP11no3.pdf
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