Kjell Hausken () and Mthuli Ncube
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Kjell Hausken: UiS, Postal: University of Stavanger, NO-4036 Stavanger, Norway
Abstract: We develop a game theoretic model for the central banks profit and the markets profit dependent on quantitative easing (QE) or no quantitative easing (no QE), where the market responds by lowering interest rates, keeping interest rates unchanged, or raising interest rates. The model is compared with empirical data. We classify 69 QE events and 69 no QE counterfactuals for four central banks, i.e. 17 events for the Federal Reserve, 9 events for Bank of England, 32 events for Bank of Japan, and 11 events for the European Central Bank. The market response to the BoJ and ECB QE is almost exclusively to keep interest rates unchanged. Although this response is most common to the Federal Reserve QE (9 events), the market frequently responds as the Federal Reserve prefers, by lowering interest rates (7 events). For BoE the market response is evenly split across the three outcomes.
Keywords: Central bank; quantitative easing; global economic crisis; market response
19 pages, June 13, 2013
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uis_wps_2013_4_hausken_ncube.pdf
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