Loran Chollete () and David Schmeidler
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Loran Chollete: UiS, Postal: University of Stavanger, NO-4036 Stavanger, Norway
David Schmeidler: Tel Aviv University
Abstract: Where do central bank priors come from and how do policymakers evaluate a model before empirical probabilities are available? To address these questions, we analyze two central banks that choose priors about a rare disaster with the help of expert policy teams. Policymakers are misspecification averse when assessing subjective evidence, and therefore hedge in their selection of priors. This hedging results in priors that accommodate a modicum of belief disagreement.
Keywords: Belief Disagreement; Central Bank; Misspecification Aversion; Rare Disaster; Subjective Evidence
JEL-codes: A10
17 pages, August 30, 2014
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uis_wps_2014_15_chollete_schmeidler.pdf
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