(), Antoine Billot
and Joseph Lanfranchi
Mahmood Arai: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Antoine Billot: ERMES, Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II
Joseph Lanfranchi: ERMES, Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II
Abstract: Within an organization, a bounded rational principal organizes a promotion test based on a sequence of test regarding candidates' relative performances. We assume the principal to suffer from limited ability to rank the performances, only identifying the best in each test. Furthermore, he satisfies the expected gains do not decreases whit the information generated by additional tests. Then, mentoring is shown to improve the information about candidates' ability when the principal offers help to the current best candidate provided by a manager promoted after a similar contest.
27 pages, October 8, 1999
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sten Nyberg ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:38:20.