Jonas Häckner () and Sten Nyberg ()
Additional contact information
Jonas Häckner: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Sten Nyberg: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract:
In media markets, the value of advertisement exposure depends on circulation, and media consumers’ valuation is affected by advertising. This paper analyzes media market competition in a duopoly framework. There exist symmetric and asymmetric equilibria in terms of firm size. There is less scope for asymmetry when products are more differentiated or of higher intrinsic quality. Some media exhibit public good features. This increases the scope for asymmetry when consumers value advertising positively. If their valuation is negative only symmetric equilibria exist. Regulations limiting price competition increase the scope for natural monopoly. Finally, monopoly is a less likely outcome in subscription-based media markets.
Keywords: Market Concentration; Oligopoly; Demand Externalities; Advertising; Media Markets
JEL-codes: D43; L11; L13; L15; M37
31 pages, January 11, 2000
Full text files
wp00_03.pdf
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