Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Research Papers in Economics,
Stockholm University, Department of Economics

No 2000:6: Amissibility and Common Belief

Geir B. Asheim () and Martin Dufwenberg
Additional contact information
Geir B. Asheim: Department of Economics ,University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, PO Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Martin Dufwenberg: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

Keywords: Admissibility; Denkel-Fudenberg; common belief

JEL-codes: C72

28 pages, February 29, 2000

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