Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Research Papers in Economics,
Stockholm University, Department of Economics

No 2000:7: Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games

Geir B Asheim ()
Additional contact information
Geir B Asheim: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

Abstract: We justify the application to extensive games of the concept of ‘fully permissible sets’, which corresponds to choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. he e tensive games considered illustrate how our concept yields support to forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.

Keywords: Extensive Game; Deductive reasoning; backward induction

JEL-codes: C72

20 pages, February 29, 2000

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